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JAPANESE-CHINESE IMPORT TRADE COMPETITION
DURING THE 1930s CRISIS
Nawiyanto
Department of History, Faculty of Letters, Jember University, Jember 68121, East Java, Indonesia
E-mail: nawi_@hotmail.com

Abstract
In the Indonesian historiography, the contest for market between the Chinese and indigenous traders has long attracted
much scholarly attention, however this issue was actually only part of the story. This article seeks to elaborate the
Japanese and Chinese import trade competition in Java during the 1930s depression. Drawing upon both primary and
secondary historical materials, it is argued that instead of creating a time of hardships, the crisis paved the way for
Japan’s import trade expansion. Benefiting from the creation of large market for cheap products among the customers in
Java suffering from a decline in purchasing power and their owned trade networks, a great number of Japan products
will soon controlle the market. The Chinese found that their well-established economic position was seriously
threatened. Although Japan’s fast rising market domination was eventually removed, it was due to the changing of the
socio-political environment that created major obstacles for the Japanese to maintain its position, rather than that of the
responses of the Chinese traders.
Keywords: 1930s crisis, Chinese traders, import trade, Japanese traders, Java

looks at the Japanese-Chinese competition specifically
in import trade. The geographical and temporal settings

1. Introduction
The rebirth of Japan under the Meiji era (1868-1912)
had radically changed Japan and its relations with other
countries. Japan emerged as a modern powerful state
both in military and economic terms and had an equal
position to the western colonial powers (van Dijk, 1994).
No less important, from 1899 the Japanese received
“European status” in the Netherlands Indies (De Graeff,
1945; Fasseur, 1994). The modernization of Japan,
however, posed a serious danger to the neighbouring
countries because Japan began to demonstrate a strong
territorial ambition (Aziz, 1955). This development
inevitably placed Japan in a series of conflicts,
including with China, one of its major sources of
cultural influence. The two powers, for example,
competed for a political hegemony over Korea and
Formosa in 1894-1895. By the Treaty of Shimonoseki
signed on 17 April 1895, Japan established its political
control over the two territories (Hane, 1986; Storry,
1963). China was forced further to cede part of her
territory, Shantung, which was previously colonized by
Germany to Japan in 1919 (Mouw, 1937-1938; Aziz,
1955; Van Dijk, 1994).

of the article are Indonesia’s most densely-populated
island of Java during the 1930s crisis. It seeks to explain
the Japanese import trade expansion in the island and to
examine the responses of the Chinese business
community. This article argues that Japan’s import trade
expansion in Java during the crisis was facilitated by
combined factors of decline in population’s purchasing
power, competitive price of Japanese products,
organizational and marketing strategies. The deterioration
of the Japan’s role in import trade market in Java was
primarily due to the changing political environment in
which Japan’s business activities were run, rather than
due to the loss of the Japanese in business competition
to the Chinese enjoying benefits from the restrictive
measures taken by the Dutch colonial government.

2. Methods
The research applies historical method. The choice is
based on the fact that the research is categorized as a
study of history. Therefore, historical method is the best
way to address the subject matter. Historical method
basically consists of four stages: 1) heuristics
(collection of source materials); 2) external criticism
(examining the authenticity of historical sources); 3)
internal criticism (examining the credibility of

The competition between the two powers was not only
in the above geographical areas, but also in other places
where Chinese communities developed. The article
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information), and 4) historiography (composing an
historical account by synthesising credible historical
facts) (Gottschalk, 1986).
This research will draw upon both primary and
secondary sources. The primary sources include official
and organizational publications. Two major materials in
this category are The Netherlands-Indies, which was
published by the Department of Economic Affairs, and
Economic Bulletin of Netherlands India, issued by the
Department of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce.
Equally important are Indisch Verslag and Economisch
Weekblad voor Nederlandsch Indië. They were
collected primarily from the National Library of the
Republic of Indonesia, Jakarta. The secondary sources
include all relevant published and unpublished materials
collected from diverse places especially in Jember,
Yogyakarta, Jakarta, Canberra, and Singapore.

3. Result and Discussion
3.1 Japan’s Import Trade Expansion
The economic penetration of the Japanese in colonial
Java had already occurred around the early twentieth
century, but only from the late 1920s it intensified. This
process reflected three major waves of the Japanese
trade development. The first wave primarily consisted
of itinerant traders, which was subsequently followed by
shop owners. Together they could possibly be grouped
under a category of retail traders. In 1914 there were 74
Japanese shop owners and 144 Japanese employed as
shop keepers, beside the remaining 56 itinerary traders
of the first wave. Before the First World War the
Japanese business mostly operated in major urban areas
of the island, such as Batavia, Semarang, and Surabaya
(Murayama, 1998). A Chinese eyewitness said that they
were also found in inland town of East Java, Malang
(Tjamboek Berdoeri, 2004). Another major feature was
that the Japanese traders still relied largely on the
Chinese rather than on Dutch trading firms. The
Japanese-Chinese partnership was built, for example, in
Surabaya and Batavia with a primary objective to
increase commercial relations for the benefits of the two
business communities (Post, 2002).
The third wave was formed by Japanese large trading
firms. The disruption of import supplies from Europe
resulting during the war opened the great opportunity
for the Japanese business interests to establish their own
trade networks. Among others, the illustrations included
Suzuki Shoten, Mitsubishi Trading Co., Nippon Menka,
Gosho, and Toyo Menka (Murayama, 1998). This
development marked the beginning of a new era of the
Japanese trade expansion in colonial Java, as observable
elsewhere in Southeast Asia too. There were important
events recorded during this new era. One of them was
the establishment of the South Seas Association (Nanyô
Kyôkai) in 1915, a communication forum for influential
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businessmen, zaibatsu (Japanese conglomerates; Howe,
1996) leaders, and Japanese political elites. Using their
influences, this association searched for the
government’s support in order to protect the overseas
Japanese business interests. They believed that with
support of the government, the Japanese business
groups would be able to challenge Chinese commercial
power in colonial Java and elsewhere in Southeast Asia
(Post, 2002).
The peak of Japanese import trade expansion came
along with the world-wide 1930s depression. The crisis
hit very hard the economy of Java and other parts of
colonial Indonesia, although it should be mentioned that
the level of hardships the events had brought to the
Indonesian population varied across regions and social
groups. The collapse of commercial agriculture caused a
remarkable loss in income and jobs (Boomgaard, 2000).
Many people became unemployed with the closure of
estates and the decisions of the remaining estate
enterprises to cut down their operation (Furnivall,
1939/1967; Elson, 1984). While the land rents paid to
the Indonesian farmers in Java were cut down, those
who were still employed in the estate enterprises and
public offices found that their salaries and wages were
drastically reduced (Furnivall, 1939/1967; Nawiyanto,
2000). Unsurprisingly, the 1930s depression was
described an economic catastrophe for colonial Indonesia
(Dick, 1988). The national income of the population as
a whole decreased steeply from 3,478 million guilders
to 2,022 million guilders or a decline by 42 per cent
(Higgins, 1963). But for Japanese traders, the depression
years were a good time for them to strengthen their
business operation in colonial Java.
Finding a decline in prosperity and purchasing power,
many people in Java were no longer able to afford
European-made consumption goods. They were forced
to adjust their expenditure by using cheaper products
(Odenkirchen, 1936; Indisch Verslag, I, 1932/1933).
The alternative for this was provided by Japanese
traders selling reasonably good and cheap products
(Stokhuysen, 1938:; Blokhuis, 1933; Morris-Suzuki,
1984). They often advertised that their products were
the world’s cheapest ones (Figure 1). The Japanese
traders could sell products at a competitive price
because costs of labour were lower in Japan than in
European and North American countries (Booth, 2000).
In the 1930s the Japanese products became much
cheaper for three other major reasons. First, the cost of
production was further reduced with the rising
productivity stemming from rationalization measure
between 1927 and 1931. Second, the devaluation of
Japanese yen, which reduced its exchange rate from
113.3 yen per 100 guilders in 1931 to 50.25 guilders in
1933 and to 42.69 guilders in 1935, caused a steep fall
in prices of the Japanese products in colonial Java. The
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Hua Sing, the shares of the import trade of colonial
Indonesia with Japan increased at average from 10 per
cent between 1925 and 1930 to 19 between 1930 and
1934 (Lim, 1981: Appendix I, in Brown, 1994). Japan’s
exports grew more rapidly to Indonesia than to the
Asian market as a whole. Anne Booth estimates that
between 1929 and 1933, Indonesia’s imports from
Japan, in real terms, became twofold (Booth, 1994). The
value of Japan’s exports to Indonesia, in absolute terms,
was also higher than to any other Asian country (Booth,
1992; Indisch Verslag, I, 1933/1934).

Figure 1. A Full Page Newspaper Advertisement
Announcing a Big Sale for Two Weeks by Japan
Shops in Surabaya. (Source: Soeara Oemoem, 10,
14, 18, and 23 January 1933)

third factor was the decrease in freight rates due to the
Japan-Dutch shipping competition. This cut down
further the prices of import products from Japan
(Shimizu, 1988; Morris-Suzuki, 1984). Moreover, the
geographical position of Japan offered more advantages
to channel goods to colonial Indonesia than that of
European and North American countries (Blokhuis,
1933).
All the above factors made a great contribution to the
success of Japan in gaining impressive share of the
import market in colonial Java. In a broader context,
this achievement placed Indonesia as “Japan’s most
important trading partner in Southeast Asian countries”
(Brown, 1994). Despite the annual fluctuations, the
Indonesian import trade with Japan experienced a rising
trend (Gongrijp, 1928; Gongrijp, 1967). In 1925 the
value of import trade with Japan was 90 millions guilder
or 11 percent of the total imports of colonial Indonesia.
This figure was much higher than a value of 7 millions
guilder (1.7 per cent) recorded in 1913. By 1930, the
value of import trade with Japan reached around 100
millions guilder. This figure was impressive too, even
though in relative terms, the share remained more or
less constant. The largest share was in 1934, reaching to
32 percent (Dick, 1989). Based on a calculation by Lim

In several cases, even the achievement of Japan’s
import trade in Java was more remarkable. In 1926, for
example, Japan already took over the position of United
Kingdoms as the largest supplier of textiles to colonial
Indonesia (Dick, 1989). Figure 2 demonstrates the share
of the values of Java’s cotton imports from five major
countries. It can be seen that from 1926 imports from
Japan accounted for more than 75 per cent of total
values of Java’s cotton imports. The shares of Japan
kept on rising to more than 80 per cent from 1930
onwards. This trend was in contrast to the steep fall in
value shares of cotton imports from the Netherlands and
United Kingdom, which initially had been the major
suppliers (Broek, 1942; Van der Eng, 2007). To a lesser
extent, a decrease in values of cotton imports also
occurred in the case of the Indonesian import trade with
China. Besides textile, Japan gained more than 80
percent of the cement market in Java and Madura (Dick,
1989). In 1934 Japan was also reported to have won a
large portion of the import trade in bicycles and canned
fish in colonial Indonesia (Blokhuis, 1935).
Apart from the growing share, imports from Japan
became more diversified as well. Until around 1920, the
imports from Japan consisted primarily of cotton goods
(Murayama, 1998; Dick, 1989; Indisch Verslag, I,
1935/1936). Several firms concentrating on textile
imports especially cotton were the Nihon Menka
Kabushiki Gaisha, Toyo Menka Kabushiki Gaisha, and
Gosho Kabushiki Gaisha (Stibbe, 1927; Meta, 2008).
Other articles were practically negligible. By 1932,
however, more articles were imported from Japan,
including electric bulbs, sheet iron, cast iron-tubing,
galvanized iron roofing, wire, wire nails, electric cables,
and accumulators. Also on the list were things like
bicycle and spare parts, beer, fish-preserves, sweet,
toilet soap, caustic soda, resin, cement, triplex cases,
wall
tiles,
window-glass,
paper,
glass-ware,
earthenware, haberdashery, small iron ware, bicycle tire,
and carbide. With all these products, Japan transformed
herself as a powerful competitor for European and
American industrial producers (Furnivall, 1939/1967).
Even in some cases, “European countries have been
gradually driven out of the import market in the
Netherlands Indies by Japan” (“The Netherlands Indies,
1935).
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The success of Japanese traders in penetrating the
import market of Java was due to not only the cheap
products, but to the adoption of combined strategies.
First, unlike the European traders leaving retail trade to
the Chinese, the Japanese soon tried to develop their
own business network which handled both import
activities and distribution system (Liem 1995; Boeke,
1953). As G.N. Carey, British Acting Commercial
Agent at Batavia succinctly put it, “the system of
importing and distributing Japanese wares, through
shipping, transport, wholesale and retail sales
organizations, entirely under Japanese control, has
become fairly well perfected during the year 1933”
(Sugiyama, 1994). Similarly, on Japanese networks,
Van Mook wrote: “the rising flood of imports carried
Japanese goods from Japanese importers, in Japanese
ships, financed by Japanese banks, to Japanese
warehouses in the coastal towns of Java, to be sold
directly to the consumers through Japanese retailers far
in the interior” (Van Mook, 1945; Van Mook, 1944).
Meanwhile, a Dutch figure involved in the 1934 JapanNetherlands Indies trade negotiation, J. van Gelderen,
wrote “one Japanese chain ran from Yokohama to the
native village” (Van Gelderen, 1939). The strategy of
building its own import trade network was employed
partly due to the growing risks of relying too much on
Chinese network. The Chinese boycotts of Japanese
products grew in scale and intensity because of the
increasingly tense political relations between the two
East Asian countries (Clarence-Smith, 2000).
Second, the Japanese shops in running their business
employed indigenous salesmen too. Commenting on
Bandung, West Java, J.S. Furnivall noted, “small
natives lads were doing a thriving trade for their
Japanese employers” (Furnivall, 1939/1967). Third, the
Japanese stores sold their goods at fixed prices,
strikingly different from common practice among the
Asians, including the Chinese (Liem, 1995). Finally,
The Japanese traders tried hard to have a close
knowledge of the local market and to understand the
psychology of the buyers (Van Gelderen, 1939).
Commenting on Japanese sales agents, Ernest Hauser
noted that they were persistent in winning potential
buyers. When finding little interest in their products
among shop owners, Japanese sales agent would
actively ask what the customers actually wanted. After
they observed sample goods provided by a shop owner,
the Japanese sales agents would assure that their
companies in Japan were able to produce the same
articles with a much lower price (Hauser, 1941; Post,
2002). Unsurprisingly, in the western countries the
Japanese was popularly described as “cut-rate imitators”
(Jones, Frost, & White, 1993).
The statistics of Japanese firms and employers in Java
indicated the significance of the Japanese business and
their networks in Java. In 1933 there were 424 Japanese
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trading firms, consisting of 61 large trading firms and
363 retailers. Of this total number of firms, 58 were in
Surabaya, 32 in Jakarta, 27 in Semarang, 15 in
Bandung, and 12 in Cirebon. About 20 Japanese shops
operated in Kediri, Lumajang, Jember and Banyuwangi
(Liem, 1995) George D. Larson noted in Surakarta that
there were 27 Japanese shops and small firms (Larson,
1990). Kenichi Goto noted that many Japanese shops
were found around the city square, which made the area
being alike a Japanese town, and that there a year before
the Japanese built a Japanese school (Goto, 1988). A
1935 colonial report revealed that the Japanese shops
continued to mushroom across the island (Liem, 1995).
A micro study on an East Java district town by an
American antropologist, Clifford Geertz corroborates
the same trend. Three Japanese shops selling cheap
Japanese products were said to have been established
(Geertz, 1986).
One of the leading Japanese business networks was
Nanyô Shôkai, established in 1909 by Tsutsumibayashi
Kazue in Semarang, Central Java. In 1927 the Nanyô
Shôkai had 20 branch shops and employed 127 Japanese
workers, excluding Indonesians. Its branch shops were
found in Batavia and Bandung, and other towns such as
Cilacap, Purworejo and Blitar. Another major network
spreading to almost all small towns in Central Java was
controlled by Kaneko Kenji. His shop was first
established in Kutoarjo, but later also in Muntilan,
Magelang, Wonosobo, and Purworejo. A number of
branch shops were also found in Kebumen, Kroya,
Prembun and Karanganyar. Besides the two leading
figures, there were other figures ran different Japanese
shops. One of them was Sawabe Masao, running the
Fuji Yôkô (Fuji Shop), the largest Japanese shop in
Yogyakarta (Meta, 2008). Sawabe’s Fuji Shop in
Surakarta was popular among the local aristocrats
(Larson, 1990). Other Japanese shop owners were
Otomo Shintarô (Otomo Shôten/Shop, in Tegal),
Tamaki Choichi (Daruma Shôkai, Jakarta), Kida Eiji
(Kida Shop, Bandung), and Nakagawa Anjiro (Okazaki
Shôten, Malang) (Meta, 2008).
The Japanese business population grew too. In 1919 the
Japanese business population in Java was 564 people,
including both employers and employees (Murayama,
1998). By 1933 there were 543 Japanese employers in
East Java alone, whereas in Central and West Java their
numbers were 288 and 260 employers respectively
(Sugiyama, 1994). No statistical data on number of
Japanese employees are available, but it is very likely
that there was an increase resulting from the growing
number of Japanese shops in the island. In 1915 the
Japanese engaging in trade accounted for 29 percent of
the population, and by 1930 it rose to 35 percent. A
considerable increase in number of business population
was reported to have taken place in Surabaya
(Murayama, 1994). Elsewhere in Java, Larson noted
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that in 1936 the majority of the Japanese residing in
Surakarta, Klaten, Boyolali, Sragen, Wonogiri, and
Tawangsari (Central Java) was shop owners or their
workers (Larson, 1990). Shimizu Hajime indicates that
there was a rapid increase in the number of Japanese
traders in the 1930s, while a newspaper report
mentioned that many Japanese played a similar role to
the Chinese (Hajime, 1994; Djawa Tengah, 31 January
1931).

30
25
20
15
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5

3.2 Responses of the Chinese
Unlike the consumers of Java considering cheap
Japanese products as mitigating their difficulties
stemming from the crisis, for many Chinese traders they
posed a big threat (Prince, 1989). Prior to the 1929 crisis
the Chinese had played a major role in commercial
sector in colonial Java. But there was a significant
change from the late 1920s. Together with the
depression, the expanding Japanese business was
regarded as a serious threat to many Chinese traders.
Commenting on Yogyakarta, Governor De Cock
described Japanese traders as the major competitor for
the long-established Chinese businessmen (Kwartanada,
2002). Meanwhile, Resident of Batavia, L.G.C.A. van
der Hoek reported in 1934 that the Japanese traders
added an extra difficulty for the Chinese, apart from the
declining demands of goods resulting from a drop in
people’s purchasing power (Kartodirdjo, Hatmosuprobo
& Soeroto, 1980). For the Chinese, the Japanese were
considered more dangerous competitor than European
and
indigenous
businessmen
(Liem,
1995).
Unsurprisingly, it was reported that the competition in
Java’s import trade grew tighter in the 1930s (Indisch
Verslag, 1933).
One of the consequences of the expanding Japanese
import trade could be seen in the case of goods imports
from China and Hongkong. The activities in this field
were almost exclusively under the control of the
Chinese trading houses. Among the list of imported
articles, there were textiles, matches, paper,
haberdashery, victuals, cigarettes, and canned fruits
(Cator, 1936). As can been seen in Figure 1, the imports
from China, including Hongkong, between 1930 and
1935 experienced a deterioration. A sharp decline by
around 50 percent occurred from 1930 to 1933 and the
decline continued to occur in the following years. This
process took place, despite the considerable growth of
mainland China’s economy, including its modern
industrial sector during the 1930s (Myers, 1989), and
the bigger need of foreign market to sell their products.
In 1933 China accounted for 7.5 per cent of the
Indonesia’s total greys imports, while Japan made up 90
percent of the imports. By 1935 China’s share decreased
to 0.37 percent, while Japan’s share increased to 97
percent. China also suffered from Japan competition in
sheeting trade. In 1932 China and Japan made up
respectively 51 percent and 49 percent of the trade in

0
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Sources: Cator, 1936: 76-77; for 1936-1940, Indisch Verslag,
II, 1941: 347.
Figure 2. Value of Colonial Indonesia’s Import from
China (Including Hongkong) 1928-1940 (in
million guilders)

sheeting in Indonesia. But, the share of China decreased
steeply to 8 percent in 1935 and that of Japan, by
contrast, increased sharply to 91 percent (Wirodihardjo,
1945). A 1934 colonial report revealed that the Chinese
also suffered seriously from Japan in crockery trade
(Indisch Verslag, I, 1934/1935).
The Chinese responded the Japan’s import trade
penetration into the Javanese market in several ways.
Some Chinese showed their hostility to the expanding
Japanese business which posed a real threat to their
commercial interests. In 1927 there were already reports
on anti-Japanese boycotts and terrors against stores
selling Japanese products (Kwartanada, 2002 Liem,
1995). In the 1930s anti-Japanese boycott also occurred
(Stokhuyzen, 1938). A call for boycotting Japanese
products was voiced, for example, by Tjung See Gan,
one of the biggest textile importers in Batavia (Twang,
2005). Anti-Japanese boycott was actually not a new
phenomenon. Part of the Chinese traders had done the
same thing earlier, for example in 1915 (Cator, 1936).
Such an action had been quite common among the
overseas Chinese living in the South Seas, including
Indonesia before the 1929 depression. The actions could
be seen as a manifestation of economic nationalism
when they were irritated by Japan which undermined
their trade position (Akashi, 1968).
There were illustrations indicating a response to Japan
threat in the form of terrors occurring during the 1930s.
A shop in Yogyakarta was reported to have been
blemished by black paint, and in another case, faeces
were repeatedly thrown in front of shop door because of
selling Japanese goods (Kwartanada, 2002). A similar
terror was reported to have occurred to a shop in Besuki
owned by Oen Sioe Lok on October 17, 1930 (Keng Po,
25 October 1930). The picture of anti-Japanese goods
sentiment developing in the 1930s might have been not
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much different from what broke out in big cities of Java,
including Surabaya, Semarang, Bandung, Cirebon, and
Batavia in the 1920s, as described by Akhasi. In the
1930s the call for closing Japan-related wholesale and
retail stores and for using Chinese goods, and the active
role of newspapers in demanding public support for the
boycotts likely occurred (Akashi, 1968; Indisch Verslag,
1938/1939). The unfriendly events, however, did not
completely discourage a few Chinese traders in Java
from continuing business connections with the Japanese
because they were quite profitable (Kwartanada, 2002).
Finally, it is worthwhile noting the response by the
China government. For the economy of China, the
Japanese import trade expansion in Java and elsewhere
in colonial Indonesia meant a loss of important foreign
market for its products. As shown in Figure 2, the value
of China’s exports to colonial Indonesia decreased
steeply from 28.4 millions guilder in 1930 to 12.6
millions guilder in 1933 and further to 11.5 millions
guilder in 1934. An estimate suggested that in 1934 the
value of China’s export to colonial Indonesia decreased
to one third of the 1929 figure (The Netherlands Indies,
1935). An observation by Djie Ting Liat for the trade
situation between 1934 and 1935 suggested a decline in
China import trade in colonial Indonesia (Djie, 1935).
This decline confirms a general observation by Eric
Jones, Lionel Frost, and Colin White that during the
1930s crisis China’s overseas market shrunk (Jones,
Frost, & White, 1993). Facing the market contraction
for its products in colonial Indonesia, the China
government sent official delegates to Batavia to
negotiate with the Dutch colonial government in order
to promote closer commercial relations between the two
countries (Cator, 1936). Meanwhile, to achieve this goal
the Dutch colonial government established a special
body, called the Commission for advancing Trade
Relations with China, which was stipulated by the
Decree of the Governor General of July 17, 1935 (The
Netherlans Indies 1935). Such an effort was apparently
regarded necessary to adjust with a new environment in
which business players operated. The next section will
elaborate this issue.
3.3 Business in a Changing Environment
There was a crucial development which had serious
effects on import trade in colonial Indonesia, marked by
the promulgation of Crisis Import Ordinance (Crisis
invoerordonanntie) in September 1933. This regulation
gave the Dutch colonial government the rights to
temporarily stop and to impose quota on import of
specified articles (Prince, 1989; The Netherlands Indies,
1936). The objectives were to protect Netherlands
Indies Industry, to promote import trade with those
countries constituting the principal buyers of the
Netherlands Indies products, and to protect the interests
of the existing importing and distributing apparatus in
the country (The Netherlands Indies, 1936). In handling
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all matters relating regulations on import quota, the
Dutch colonial government consulted with its official
advisor, the Netherlands Indies Association of
Wholesale Importers (Nederlandsch-Indische Vereeniging
van Importeurs-Groothandelaren, NIVIG), established
in 1934 by the main western importers in colonial
Indonesia (Lindblad, 2003; Liem, 1995; Indisch
Verslag, I, 1936/1937). All the restrictive measures
taken in the 1930s reflected a shift in colonial economic
policy from a free trade and open door orientation that
had been set in place from around 1870 to a more
government intervention (Booth, 1992; Barber, 1939).
The restrictions impacted differently on Japan-and
China-related business interests. Japan’s import trade
was the first to suffer from the restrictions. Indeed,
Japan was the primary target of the regulations.
Curtailing the Japanese influence on the colonial
Indonesia market was the key argument for the
imposition of the restrictive measures (1989; Burger,
1977/1983). The measures were intended to, As G.H.C.
Hart put it, “prevent undue economic penetration by
Japan” (Hart, 1942) or to counter “the so-called
Japanese threat” (Booth, 1994). The Japan government
described the measures as “anti-Japanese policy” (van
Mook, 1945; Van Mook, 1944) with the issuance of the
quota system, the share of cement import from Japan
was restricted from 97 per cent in 1932 to 58 per cent in
1936. Quota system was also applied to imports of
cambric, sarong, and beer. Consequently, there was a
steep decrease in imports of cambric from 81 per cent in
1933 to 43 per cent in 1936. Over the same period, the
imports of beer decreased from 62 per cent to 19 per
cent, while import of sarongs was especially reserved
for the Netherlands. The quota system was also applied
to other import articles such as pottery, yarns, electric
lamps, bicycle tires, fertilizers and several others (Dick,
1989). All the restrictions led to the decrease in Japan’s
share of the import trade of colonial Indonesia. A sharp
decline in Japan’s import shares of the colonial
Indonesia occurred between 1934 and 1937. The share
of imports dropped from 32.5 per cent to 15 per cent
(Dick, 1989) or a decline by more than 50 per cent.
Parallel with this development, the freight traffic from
Japan to colonial Indonesia declined too (The
Netherlands Indies, 1939).
Apart from Japan’s declining share in the import
market, the Japanese business community in Java and
elsewhere in colonial Indonesia found that operating
business after 1933 became harder than before. Apart
from the quota system, the enforcement of restriction on
entering foreigners imposed further pressures on shops
operated by the Japanese (Murayama, 1998). On June
1933 the Minister for Colonies, Hendrik Colijn
instructed Governor General B.C. de Jonge to arrange a
secret system of intelligence report on Japanese people
and their activities (Larson, 1990). Among the Dutch
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officials, there was a suspicion that the Japanese shops
and other forms of Japanese activities were only a mask
of espionage (Frederick, 1989). The suspicion grew
stronger after 1935 and changed the Dutch view on
Japanese community in colonial Indonesia that “they
were hard working and quiet immigrants who held aloof
from subversive and spying activities and gave the
police little trouble” (Netherlands Information Bureau,
1944). The Japanese very likely realized that there were
colonial secret agents always spying on them.
Unlike the Japanese, some Chinese were among the
gainer of the import restrictions. With the decrease in
volumes of goods imports from Japan, many Chinese
traders found that part of the commercial pressures
resulting from the Japanese competition substantially
reduced. Moreover, almost at the same time with the
efforts of the China government to improve business
relations, the Chinese business community in colonial
Indonesia had the opportunity to negotiate a
proportional import share for their motherland, China
(Cator, 1936). Indeed, unlike imports from Japan, the
import trade carried out with China was not considered
by the colonial government a real threat requiring
immediate actions to tackle. The efforts seem to have
given positive results. As indicated in Figure 2, from
1935 to 1940 China’s share in the value of the
Indonesia’s import trade tended to increase again,
although as a whole they never exceeded the 1930
figure.
Equally important, the restrictions on textile imports
from Japan provided the opportunity for the Chinese to
strengthen their role in textile production. Moreover, the
colonial government took measures to promote
domestic textile industry in the country (Palmer &
Castles, 1971). In some areas there emerged indigenous
textile producers (Wertheim, 1959). But, part of them
appeared to have been only short-lived. During the last
years of the effective Dutch rule, there was a
considerable loss of the Indonesians in the weaving
industry to the Chinese (Telkamp, 1981; Van der Eng,
2007). John O. Sutter remarked that the Chinese rapidly
took over the weaving licenses issued to the Indonesian
textile producers (Sutter, 1959). In 1939, for example,
335 of the 1,500 weaving firms in Majalaya owned by
the Indonesians were sold to the Chinese (Sitsen, 1944;
Van der Eng, 2007). An investigation into 94 sales of
the Indonesian-owned weaving firms in the area
indicated that 55 per cent of the sales went to the
Chinese (Sutter, 1959). About 30 per cent of the
mechanized looms were under the control of the
Chinese in 1940 and by 1942 the figure increased to
31.5 per cent (Kroese, 1946; Robison, 1986). In 1937
the Chinese capital also controlled 36 per cent of the
handlooms in the same area (Antlöv & Svensson, 1991).
In addition, other Chinese business benefited from the
adoption of restrictive regulations, including a lamp

bulb factory owned by Tan Tjin Lian in Cirebon
(Wirodihardjo, 1945). Unsurprisingly, Booth estimates
that from 1935 there was a significant increase in per
capita income among the Chinese population in colonial
Indonesia (Booth, 1994).
Meanwhile, there were events that posed a further blow
to the Japanese in import trade from the late 1930s. The
outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937 and Japan’s
focus on war-supporting industry reduced substantially
her ability to export. Consequently, Japan’s share of the
colonial Indonesia imports decreased to 15 per cent in
1938. In the same year the number of Japanese
population for the whole of the colonial Indonesia
decreased to around 6,500 people, consisting of 3,300
workers and 3,200 dependents (Sato, 1994). The
number of Japanese shops apparently decreased too. In
1939 in Java there were only 213 Japanese shops (Post,
2002). This figure was lower than that of Japanese
retailers operating in the island in 1933 as mentioned
above. The increasingly tense political relations
between Japan and colonial Indonesia and Japan’s
appeal to her citizens to go home marked the end of the
Japanese import trade expansion in colonial Java. The
last ship evacuating Japanese people, Fuji Maru, left
Indonesia on December 2, 1941 a few days before the
Japan-Dutch War was officially declared (Meta, 2008).

4. Conclusion
This article has indicated Japan’s rapidly growing
position in the import trade market of Java during the
1930s crisis. Benefiting from the shift in people’s
preference to cheap products due to the crisis-led
decline in purchasing power, Japan-made goods
captured a remarkable share in the import trade market
of Java. Even in several cases Japan’s goods were able
to become the market leader, replacing the position
previously taken by products from western countries.
The most illustrative example here was textile products.
The success of Japan’s import trade penetration in Java,
however, was not only due to the fact that Japan
products were cheaper than goods produced by western
countries. Also an integral part of the expansion was the
establishment of the Japan owned business networks
handling import activities and distribution system, the
employment of indigenous marketing staff, the close
knowledge of the local market and the well
understanding of the psychology of the buyers.
The emergence of Japan as the major supplier of the
Java’s import and the growing presence of the Japanese
traders with their own business networks were
immediately felt as a real threat to the Chinese. Many
Chinese businessmen found that their long-established
position in the import trade market was increasingly
undermined the rapidly expanding role of the Japanese
traders and their networks. They were badly affected by
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the decline in import activities and distribution of goods
originating from both western countries and the
mainland China, which previously provided them a
major source of profits. A relief for the Chinese business
was obtained when Japan’s role in Java’s import trade
shrunk with the promulgation of restrictive measures in
the late 1930s and eventually ended by the declaration
of war between Japan and the Netherlands Indies. But
this episode was not the end of the Japanese-Chinese
import trade competition in Java. A similar event
repeated in the 1990s crisis after Japan succeeded in
regaining the major share in the Indonesia’s import trade
during the New Order period. This issue still needs to be
explored further.

Boomgaard, P. (2000). Surviving the slump:
developments in real income during the depression of
the 1930s in Indonesia, particularly Java. In P.
Boomgaard and I. Brown (Eds.), Weathering the storm:
The economies of Southeast Asia in the 1930s
depression. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies.
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